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THE MARBURY MYSTERY:
WHY DID WILLIAM MARBURY SUE IN
THE SUPREME COURT?
Susan Low Bloch*
In 1801, when William Marbury petitioned the Supreme
Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State
James Madison to deliver his commission as justice of the peace,
he initiated one of the most important cases in the Court's history. But why did Marbury choose the Supreme Court? Was
there a lower federal court that could have granted the writ at
the time? The short answer is "yes." Rather than making an unsuccessful attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, I have learned that he could have
brought his suit in the then newly-created Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia. Did Marbury know of this possibility?
Would the Circuit Court have granted the requested writ of
mandamus? As this essay will show, the answer to both these
questions is "probably yes." That being so, the intriguingindeed, mysterious-questions surrounding Marbury's choice of
forum warrant further examination.
First, a brief recap of the facts of Marbury v. Madison. 1 In
the waning days of the Federalist Administration of President
John Adams, the outgoing Federalist Congress enacted the "Act
Concerning the District of Columbia," authorizing the president
to appoint as many justices of the peace for D.C. as he thought
"expedient." Each would serve for five-year terms. 2 President
* Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to
thank my colleague Vicki Jackson and my husband Rich Bloch for helping me edit this
article, my research assistants, Robert Dean and Caroline Nolan for their research assistance, and Georgetown University Law Center for its generous writing grant and sabbatical.
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. "Act Concerning the District of Columbia," enacted on February 27, 1801, provided for "such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the President of
the United States shall from time to time think expedient, to continue in office five
years." 2 Stat. 103, §11. Under the statute, the justices were to have, "in all matters, civil
and criminal, and in whatever relates to the conservation of the peace ... all the powers
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Adams nominated forty-two justices-twenty-three for Washington County on the Maryland side of the Potomac River and
nineteen for Alexandria County on the Virginia side. 3 After the
Senate confirmed and the President signed the commissions, it
was the responsibility of the Secretary of State, John Marshall, to
affix the Great Seal of the United States to the commissions and
see to their delivery. The signing and sealing presented no problem, but time did not permit delivery of all forty-two commissions. Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency on March 4,
1801. Appalled at Adams' last minute "court-packing," Jefferson ordered his Secretary of State to withhold the undelivered
documents. 4 Four of those so deprived, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, William Harper, and Robert Townsend Hooe, 5 then
vested in, and shall perform all the duties required of, justices of the peace, as individual
magistrates, by the laws herein before continued in force in those parts of [the) district,
for which they shall have been respectively appointed; and they shall have cognizance in
personal demands to the value of twenty dollars, exclusive of costs." Id This was only
one of several efforts by the outgoing Federalists to leave their mark on the judiciary.
Sec note 27.
3. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Vol. II, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 at 183 (Macmillan, 1981); Donald 0. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson: The Political Background of
Marbury v. Madison 76 (Knopf, 1970); National Intelligencer (March 9, 1801); Alexandria Advertiser (March 9, 1801).
4. Dewey. at 80. At the time of this order, Levi Lincoln was serving as Acting Secretary of State as well as Attorney General. James Madison did not take office until May.
James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic
Struggle to Create a United States, 174 (Simon & Schuster, 2002).
5. Marbury, originally from a well-known Maryland family, had moved to Washington to work as an aide to the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert. Dewey,
Marshall Versus Jefferson at 83 (cited in note 3); John A. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That
Have Shaped the Constitution 7, 13 (Harper & Row, 1987). For an extensive description
of Marbury's life, see David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and William
Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349 (1996). The other
three petitioners were from Alexandria. Hooe, also from a well-known family, had
served as mayor of Alexandria, sheriff of Fairfax, and was one of the "boosters" advocating the advantages of Alexandria-Georgetown as the site of the new capital. Dewey,
Marshall Versus Jefferson at 84-85 (cited in note 3). Ramsey had served under Washington in the Revolutionary War, had been a pallbearer at Washington's funeral, and had
served several terms as mayor of Alexandria. Harper was a significant landholder in Alexandria, later elected alderman of the town. All four were involved in the Potomac
Company, a venture led by George Washington which intended to link the Potomac and
Ohio Rivers. Id. at 83-85. While these four were not the only ones deprived of their
commissions, only these four "staunch Federalists" sued. Id. at 83-86. The other thirteen
took no action, "perhaps because they regarded the positions as insufficiently important
to make litigation worthwhile." Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at
184 (cited in note 3). Jefferson said that Adams' total of forty-two justices was "too numerous," Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of
America 402-04 (Jan. 6, 1802) ("Senate Executive Journal"). So, on March 18, 1801, Jefferson made recess appointments of thirty justices-fifteen for each county. National Intelligencer, March 18, 1801. In that total of thirty, he renamed twenty-five from Adams'
list and added five new ones. Whether that twenty-five from Adams' list were the same
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sued in December 1801 in the United States Supreme Court,
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James
Madison to deliver their commissions. 6
In a landmark decision establishing the tenets of judicial review of both legislative and executive actions, Chief Justice John
Marshall, 7 writing for a unanimous court, divided his analysis
twenty-five who actually received delivery of the commissions is not clear, but it seems
likely to be the case. Why Jefferson thought it is necessary or appropriate to reappoint
justices who were already serving is also not apparent. Obviously, Marbury and his three
co-petitioners were not on Jefferson's list.
On January 6, 1802, with Congress back in session, Jefferson sought to make the rc·
cess appointments permanent and renominated the same thirty men he had appointed
the prior year. Senate Executive Journal at 402-404 (January 6, 1802). Several months
later, on April 5, 1802, Jefferson sent another message to the Senate, indicating that six
of the Justices of the Peace had resigned and/or refused the appointment. He sought to
replace them with six nominees. In addition, he noted that in his message of January 6th,
1802, he had mistakenly inserted the name of John Laird; it should, he said, have been
Benjamin More: "In the ... message of January 6th, the name of John Laird was inserted
by mistake, instead of that of Benjamin More, who, (and not John Laird,) had been
commissioned and qualified as a Justice of the Peace. I therefore beg leave to correct the
error, by restoring to its place the name of Benjamin More, and nominating him to be a
Justice of the Peace ... and by withdrawing that of John Laird." Senate Executive Journal, at 417, April 5, 1802. But it is not clear whether there really had been a mistake. John
Laird had been on Adams' original list of appointees, sec Senate Executive Journal,
March 2, 1801, at388, and had been confirmed. Senate Executive Journal, March 3, 1801,
at 390. But he had not been one of Jefferson's 1801 recess appointments. See National
Intclligencer, March 18, 1801. Whether Laird was one of the seventeen of Adams' nominees whose commission was not delivered or whether Jefferson was actually ousting
someone with a delivered commission cannot be ascertained, but Jefferson clearly was
doing all he could to get his men in these positions.
Finally, on April 27, 1802, after numerous unexplained postponements, the Senate
confirmed all these nominations. Senate Executive Journal, at 422-23, giving each county
fifteen Justices of the Peace. Ten of those in Washington County and nine of those in
Alexandria County were Adams' appointees; the other eleven were chosen by Jefferson.
6. They filed their suit during the December 1801 Term, and the Court issued a
rule calling upon Madison to show cause at the Court's next term as to why a mandamus
should not issue. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. That next term was scheduled for June 1802,
but in April 1802, Congress modified the Court's schedule, providing that the Court was
to meet only once a year, with that session scheduled for the first Monday of February.
Act of April 29, 1802, An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, 7th
Cong., Sess. I, ch. 31, §1, 1 Stat. 156-67. Since this Act was passed in April, 1802, Congress was in effect abolishing the June and December 1802 sittings (which had been established by the Judiciary Act of 1801, 6th Cong., Sess. II, ch. 4, §1) and thereby effectively recessing the Court for fourteen months. See Haskins and Johnson, History of the
Supreme Court at 141 (cited in note 3). Congress's decision to abolish the 1802 terms was
apparently motivated by a desire to delay the Court's consideration of both Marbury's
petition and the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, as discussed in notes 27 and 28. Sec
Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 13-14 (cited in note 5).
7. This was one of the first major opinions by Chief Justice Marshall. He had been
appointed by President Adams on January 20, 1801, after John Jay had refused the appointment. (Jay had been the first Chief Justice, but had resigned in 1795 to become
Governor of New York. He declined the reappointment because, he said, the judiciary
was so defectively designed that it lacked "energy, weight, and dignity." Dewey, Marshall
versus Jefferson at 51 (cited in note 3).) Marshall was unanimously confirmed on January
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into three parts. First, he held that the petitioners were entitled
to their commissions. Second, he concluded that the Secretary
of State could be the subject of judicial process, including a writ
of mandamus. Finally, he held that a writ of mandamus was the
appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs. But, said Marshall, the
Supreme Court could not constitutionally be given original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in this type of case. Because
this case was not within one of the two areas of original jurisdiction specified by Article III of the Constitution, the Court could
act only as an appellate court in this matter. 8 And because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 17899 purportedly conferred on
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in this type of case, Section 13 was unconstitutional. Thereupon, the Court explained at length why it was justified in rendering ineffectual an Act of Congress that it found inconsistent
with the Constitution. Finally, because it had no jurisdiction in
this case, the Supreme Court denied the relief sought by Marbury and his colleagues. 10 This was a masterful opinion. Only by
asking the questions in the order he used, with jurisdiction last,
and by creatively finding a conflict between Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and Article III of the Constitution,11 could Marshall
27, 1801. See Albert Beveridge, 2 The Life of John Marshall 557 n.2 (Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1916); Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life in the Law 353-54 (Macmillan, 1974).
Adams signed Marshall's commission on January 31, 1801. See 6 Marshall Papers 61-62,
Library of Congress; Beveridge, 2 The Life of John Marshall at 557-58. Marshall accepted
the commission on Feb. 4, 1801 in a letter to President Adams. See 6 Marshall Papers at
73. For about a month, from February 4 until President Jefferson's inauguration on
March 4, Marshall served as both Secretary of State and Chief Justice. In fact, at Jefferson's request, Marshall stayed on slightly longer as Secretary of State. Garraty, ed.,
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 4 (cited in note 5); see text accompanying
note 63.
8. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. Article III provides: "In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S.
Canst., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73.
10. The Court's ordering of these issues-merits first followed by jurisdictiondiffered from the order Marbury's lawyer used, see 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146, 154, and
angered President Jefferson. See note 63.
11. To appreciate Marshall's creativity in finding a conflict between Section 12 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, one must remember that it was essential the same men who
wrote Article III in 1787, and then, only two years later, wrote the Judiciary Act of 1789.
One would think they would have known what they meant in Article III and while Marshall neglected to mention this fact in his opinion in Marbury, it was a point that he emphasized in several later landmark cases where he found no constitutional conflict. Thus,
in Cohens v. Virginia, where Marshall was addressing the constitutionality of another
section of the same Judiciary Act, section 25, he noted:
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assert the judicial power to review acts of both the legislative
and the executive branches without ordering anyone to do anything- and thereby avoid the risk of defianceY It was, by any
standards, a monumental opinion, far more important than the
issue that inspired it. 13
All this is generally well known. But, as suggested above,
the saga of Marbury v. Madison raises several intriguing questions.
1. Was there an alternative forum for Marbury's suit?

14

Having asked this question from the day I started teaching
this case in Constitutional Law I, I am delighted finally to be
able to answer it. The answer is: "Yes, without a doubt." On
February 27, 1801, in the same act in which Congress created the
office of Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia, it also
created the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, a three-

A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution ... is the judiciary act itself.
We know that in the Congress which passed that act were many eminent members of the Convention which formed the constitution. Not a single individual,
so far as is known, supposed the part of the act which gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State Courts in the cases therein
specified, to be unauthorized by the constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
264,420 (1821).
Similarly, in McCulloch v. Maryland, addressing the constitutionality of the Act of Congress creating a national bank, Marshall noted, in support of his conclusion that the Act
was constitutional: "[T]his can scarcely be considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now contested was introduced at a very early perioud of our history, has been recognized by
many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in
cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation .... The power now contested
was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present constitution." 17 U.S. 316,
401 (1819). Thus Marshall was clearly aware of the persuasiveness of these arguments at least when they supported the constitutionality of a statute.
12. Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History
in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301.
13. For more on the background of Marbury v. Madison, see William E. Nelson,
Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review (U. Press of Kansas,
2000); Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law
(U. Press of Kansas, 1996); Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (Yale U. Press, 1990); James M. O'Fallon, "Marbury," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219 (1992);
Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301.
14. This article will occasionally use Marbury's name as a shorthand for all four
petitioners. The petition raises essentially the same issues for all four men. Their lawyer,
Charles Lee, could establish that at least three of the commissions had been signed and
sealed; the status of Ramsay's commission was less clear. Simon, What Kind of Nation at
180 (cited in note 4). Marbury, at 143 (testimony of Mr. Daniel Brent) (Marbury and
Hooes commissions were signed, but Ramsay's was not); Marbury, at 146 (James Marshall's affidavit that Hooes' and Harper's commissions were signed and sealed, as discussed infra at note 60).
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judge court with both original and appellate jurisdiction. 15 President Adams immediately appointed three men to serve as
judges: James Marshall, younger brother of John Marshall, the
recently-appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; William
Cranch, nephew-in-law of President Adams, who would become
Chief Judge in 1806 and would serve on the Circuit Court for 54
years until his retirement in 1855; and Thomas Johnson as Chief
Judge. 16 Johnson, however, declined the appointment. He had
been one of the first Supreme Court Justices but had retired in
1793 because he found riding circuit too arduous. 17 At his retirement, he vowed not to accept any further public office, and
accordingly declined Adams's appointment to the D.C. Circuit
Court. Unfortunately for President Adams and the Federalists,
there was no time for Adams to choose another, so it was President Jefferson who appointed the first Chief Judge of the Circuit
Court, William Kilty.
15. The Organic Act of February 27, 1801, An Act Concerning the District of Co·
lumbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 105 (1801). The court was to meet four times per year, in each of
the two counties that comprised the District of Columbia, Washington County and Alex·
andria County. Id at § 4. The court was created three months after the federal government had moved to the District of Columbia from Philadelphia, a move that had been
mandated in 1790 when Congress provided that the capital would be located in a district
not more than ten miles square along the Potomac River, on land ceded to the United
States by Maryland and Virginia. See "An Act establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States," Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1
Stat. 130 (1790). Under the statute, the government would not actually move there until
December 1800. Id at § 5-6.
16. <http://air.fjc.gov/history/judges_frm.html>. Cranch was the son of Mary Smith
Cranch, the sister of First Lady Abigail Smith Adams. In addition to his long service on
the Circuit Court, Cranch is also well-known as one of the early reporters of Supreme
Court decisions, a task he undertook on his own initiative. Frank D. Wagner, The Role of
the Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 9, 15 (2001). Indeed, Cranch's
notes in Marbury have been called "the most significant synopsis by a Reporter of Decisions in United States Reports." ld. at 17-18 (quoting Paul R. Baier and Henry Putzel,
Jr., A Report on the Reporter, 1980 Sup Ct. Hist. Soc. Y. B. 10, 12).
17. Clare Cushman, ed., The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies 17891993 at 31-35 (Cong. Q., 2d ed. 1995) (Johnson's service on the Supreme Court was the
shortest in the Court's history.)
18. Kilty received a recess appointment on March 23, 1801 <http://air.
fic.gov/servelet>. National Intelligencer, March 23, 1801. He was then renominated and
confirmed in 1802. Senate Executive Journal 400-401 (Jan. 26, 1802); id. at 405 (Jan. 26,
1802).
John Marshall said that he was "excessively mortified" by their not anticipating
Johnson's refusal: "There was a negligence in that business arising from a confidence that
Mr. Johnston [sic] would accept, which I lament excessively." Letter from John Marshall
to James M. Marshall, March 18, 1801, Library of Congress: Marshall Papers, quoted in
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 80 (cited in note 3). Notwithstanding Marshall's
lament it is not clear the Adams' administration had time to check with Johnson. The
Act cr~ating the court was signed on February 27, Adams made the nomination on February 28 (only 3 days before he was to leave office), and the Senate confirmed on March
3 (the day before Adams left office). Senate Executive Journal 389 (March 3, 1801).
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Significantly, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
was up and running at least as early as March 23, 1801. 19 Thus,
there is no question the Circuit Court was in business when
Marbury filed his suit during the United States Supreme Court's
December 1801 term. Clearly, Marbury and his colleagues could
have filed their action there.
2. Why didn't Marbury file his suit in the Circuit Court?

The question is difficult to answer because it seems not to
have been discussed by anyone, either then or now. But it is virtually impossible to believe that Marbury was unaware of the
Circuit Court's existence. The Act creating that court, the Organic Act of February 27, 1801, was the same one that established Marbury's justice of the peace office. 20 The newspapers at
the time printed the full text of the Act, including a description
of both the Circuit Court and the office of justice of the peace. 21
Moreover, the same newspaper story that announced the appointment of Marbury and his forty-one brethren also heralded
the appointments of the three judges for the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia. 22 In addition, Marbury's lawyer, Charles
Lee, had been the Attorney General under Adams when the offices of justice of the peace and the Circuit Court were created
and when these appointments were made. Thus, Marbury and
his lawyer simply could not have been unaware of the creation
and staffing of the Circuit Court of D.C. 23
Perhaps Marbury and his lawyer questioned whether the
Circuit Court could lawfully issue a writ of mandamus to the
Secretary of State. They may have thought Marbury needed to
go to the highest court of the land. But there was no basis for
such a conclusion. Indeed, as subsequent case law revealed, if
they had such a concern they were doubly wrong: the Supreme
Court could not issue the writ; the Circuit Court could.
19. National Intelligencer (March 23, 1801); F. Regis Noel, The Court-House of the
District of Columbia 10 (The Law Reporter Printing Co., 1939). See, e.g., United States v.
Hammond, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 15 (1801) (court has jurisdiction to try someone for a theft
that occurred on February 26, 1801, one day before Congress created the court).
20. See note 2.
21. See Washington Federalist, (March 10, 1801); Alexandria Advertiser, (March
11, 1801).
22. See Washington Federalist, (March 7, 1801).
23. Interestingly, Charles Lee, Marbury's lawyer, had been appointed by Adams to
one of the circuit courts created by Congress in the Judiciary Act of February 1801, but
Lee had declined the appointment. Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court
at 132 (cited in note 3). Lee was also a close friend of Marshall, with no fondness for Jefferson. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 24 (cited in note 5).

614

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:607

In 1837, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia held
in United States ex rel. Stokes et al. v. Kendall that it had the
power to issue a writ of mandamus against an executive officerand ordered Postmaster General Kendall to comply with his
statutory duty to pay a government contractor, William Stokes,
money owed him by the United States.Z4 Stokes and his partners
had contracted with the government; Congress had authorized
the Solicitor of the Treasury to pay them, but the Postmaster
General had paid only a portion of the amount Congress had authorized. The Circuit Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge
Cranch-the same Judge Cranch who had been on the bench
since its creation in 1801-issued a writ of mandamus ordering
the Postmaster General to pay Stokes the remainder. 25
In concluding that it had the power to issue this order, the
Circuit Court relied on the Act of February 27, 1801, the Act
that had created the Circuit Court of the District and had given
it "cognizance of all cases in law and equity, whether arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or under the
adopted laws of Virginia and Maryland, with the only condition
that one of the parties shall be resident, or found within the district. "26 Cranch noted that, in creating this Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia, Congress had given it "all the powers
vested in the circuit courts, and the judges of the circuit courts,"
and that at the time of its creation, February 27, 1801, all the circuit courts did have these broad powers because the Judiciary
Act of 1801, enacted two weeks earlier, had so provided.Z7 Chief
24. United States ex rei. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702 (1837).
25. On the bench with Cranch in 1837 was James Stewart Morsel!. Thruston was
absent. Id. at 754.
26. 26 F. Cas. at 706 (emphasis added) (referring to the the fifth section of the act of
February 27 which provides: "[The circuit court of the District of Columbia] shall have
cognizance of all crimes and offences committed within the said district, and of all cases
in law and equity between parties, both or either of which shall be resident, or shall be
found within the said district.")
27. Two weeks before creating the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, Congress, on February 13, 1801, enacted the "Judiciary Act of 1801," 2 Stat. 90, a bill that
significantly modified the judicial structure created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Under
the 1789 structure, the judicial districts of the United States had been grouped into three
circuits-Eastern, Middle, and Southern. Each circuit court was held by two justices of
the Supreme Court (after 1793, by one justice) and the district judge of the district in
which the court was sitting. Act of Sept. 24,1789, ch. 20, § 4,1 Stat. 74-75, as modified by
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, sec 1, 1 Stat. 333. The new Judiciary Act of 1801 grouped
the districts into six circuits, expanded their jurisdiction, freed the Justices from circuit
duty, and created sixteen new circuit court judgeships to replace the now liberated Justices. 2 Stat. 89, ch. 4, § 6, 7. See Kathryn Turner Preyer's study of the Judiciary Act of
1801 in Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 494 (1961). The 1801
Act also provided that when the next vacancy on the Supreme Court occurred, it should
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Judge Cranch concluded that even though Congress had the Judiciary Act of 1801 repealed in 1802, and had reinstated the
prior, more restricted, jurisdiction of the circuit courts/ 8 the repeal did not affect the powers of the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia because it had been established on February 27,
1801 and was unaffected by the 1802 repeal. 29 Cranch concluded
that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia was different
not be filled, thereby prospectively reducing the Court from six justices to five. See Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89. (This reduction was apparently an
attempt to limit newly-elected President Jefferson's ability to appoint a Supreme Court
judge. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 8 (cited in note 5).)
President Adams quickly filled these sixteen new judgeships with the "midnight judges;"
Republicans threatened to repeal the law as soon as they could, Dewey, Marshall Versus
Jefferson at 62 (cited in note 3), and, as noted in note 28, they did so in 1802, by a strictly
partisan vote: 59 Republicans favor; 32 Federalists against. Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at 164 (cited in note 3).
28. The Judiciary Act of 1801 had been an irritant to the Republicans from the outset. While many thought the improvements were necessary and desirable, they resented
Adams' ability to appoint sixteen new Federalist judges in the waning hours of his presidency. On December 8, 1801, in his first annual message to Congress, President Jefferson urged Congress to repeal the 1801 Act. From January to March 1802, Congress debated whether it could abolish these courts and, if it could, what would become of the
judges whose terms were to be held, according to the Act "during good Behaviour."
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 64 (cited in note 3). Eventually, Congress decided
that repeal was constitutional, that the "midnight judges" could lose their positions, and
it promptly repealed the entire Judiciary Act of 1801, "revived" the former judicial system, and provided that all actions pending in the now repealed courts "shall be continued
over to the prior courts they would have been heard in before the Judiciary Act of 1801
was enacted." Act of March 8, 1802, 7th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 132 (1802), entitled
"An Act to Repeal Certain Acts Respecting the Organization of the Courts of the
United States." On April 29, 1802, Congress modified the Supreme Court's schedule so
that it would meet once a year commencing on the first Monday of February, 1803. See
note 6. As indicated, that meant no Supreme Court sessions in all of 1802.
The constitutionality of the repeal was immediately challenged by a party in one of
the transferred cases and was upheld by the Supreme Court in Stuart v. Laird in 1803. 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). See Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at
180-81 (cited in note 3). In an opinion by Justice William Paterson, (Marshall had
recused himself because, according to Cranch, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 308, Marshall had
tried the case below), the Court held that Congress has discretion to "establish from time
to time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper, and to transfer a cause from one
such tribunal to another." 5 U.S. at 309 (1803). Further, the Court upheld the practice of
Supreme Court justices' riding circuit, rejecting the argument that it was unconstitutional
to give Supreme Court justices original jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts. The Court relied on past practice and acquiescence: "practice and acquiescence ... for a period of
several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and have indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to
be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed." 5 U.S. at 309. For the relationship between Marbury and Stuart v. Laird, which
came down one week after Marbury, see Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison, and
Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 329; O'Fallon, Marbury,44 Stan. L. Rev. at 219 (cited in note 13); Nelson, Marbury v. Madison at 67-70 (cited in note 13).
29. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 707.
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from the other circuit courts. Cranch thus distinguished Mcintire
30
v. Wood, in which the Supreme Court had found that, because
of the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, circuit courts generally
did not have power to mandamus a government official. Said
Judge Cranch for the D.C. court in Kendall:
Here is a case in which a ministerial act is necessary to the
completion of an individual right under the laws of the United
States. The right of the relators, and the obligation of the
postmaster-general are clear and absolute. It is a case ia law;
and the only appropriate remedy is a writ of mandamus. This
is the only judicial tribunal which can take original cognizance
of the case and apply the proper remedy. How, then, can this
court refuse it? To refuse it would be a denial of justice ....
The proceeding by mandamus is a remedy given by that
common law which was in force in Maryland and Virginia on
the 27th of February, 1801, and continued in force in this district by the act of congress of that date, and which is still in
force here. If a case is made out, in which, according to that
law, the proceeding by mandamus is the proper remedy, this
. b oun d to grant It.
. 31
court IS

The following year, the Supreme Court agreed. Writing for
the Court in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 32 Justice
Smith Thompson held that Congress, in creating the D.C. Circuit
Court in February 27, 1801, clearly gave that court jurisdiction of
"all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and
laws of the United States, [and] the power to issue a writ of
mandamus in all such cases warranting such relief. "33 The Supreme Court concluded that mandamus was appropriate in this
case, relying on sections 1, 3, and 5 of the February 27th Act and
reasoning along the same lines as Chief Judge Cranch. Section 1
provided that the Circuit Court was to apply the laws of the state
of Maryland because it was sitting in that part of the District
when it was considering the mandamus petition. Section 3 pro30. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
31. 26 F. Cas. 702.
32. Kendall v. United States ex rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838). It is interesting to
note that the Supreme Court, in affirming the Circuit Court, asked first whether the relators were entitled to a writ of mandamus, and second whether the circuit court had jurisdiction of the case and the authority to issue the writ. Id. at 609. This is, of course, the
same sequence that Marshall used in Marbury, a sequence that we find unusual today
and that so angered Jefferson. See note 59.
33. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 625 (Thompson, joined by Story, Baldwin, McLean, Wayne,
and McKinley). Three justices, Taney, Barbour, and Catron dissented, because, in their
view, Congress had not given the D.C. Circuit Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus to an executive officer. Id. at 627, 642.
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vided that the D.C. Circuit Court was to "have all the powers by
law vested in the circuit courts, and the judges of the circuit
courts of the United States." 34 At the time of this enactment,
February 27, 1801, the Judiciary Act of 1801 was in effect, giving
the circuit courts of the whole country "cognizance of all cases in
law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the
United States;" that is, "the whole judicial power, in cases arising
under the constitution and laws. " 35 That Congress later repealed
the Judiciary Act of 1801 did not retroactively affect the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the District:
[The repeal of the Act of February 13, 1801 ,] fifteen months
afterwards, and after the court in this district had been organized and gone into operation, under the act of 27th of February, 1801, could not, in any manner, affect that law, any further than was provided by the repealing act. To what law was
the circuit court of this district to look for the powers vested
in the circuit courts of the United States, by which the court
was to be governed, during the time the act of the 13th of February was in force? Certainly to none other than that act.
And whether the time was longer or shorter before that law
was repealed, could make no difference .... [S]uch adoption
has always been considered as referring to the law existing at
the time of adoption; and no subsequent legislation has ever
been supposed to affect it. And such must necessarily be the
effect and operation of such adoption. No other rule would
furnish any certainty as to what was the law. 36

Thus, while we don't know whether or not Marbury and his
lawyer questioned the powers of the Circuit Court, we do know,
with the benefit of hindsight offered by Marbury and Kendall,
that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia could have issued a writ of mandamus against an executive officer including
the Secretary of State.
3. What would the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia have
done had Marbury and his co-petitioners filed suit there?
There is good reason to believe Marbury and his colleagues
would have prevailed in the Circuit Court. As just observed, the
34. Id. at 624.
35. Id. at 625; see§ 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1801.
36. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 625. Interestingly, Attorney General Butler, arguing that the
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction in the Kendall case, said that if it had such jurisdiction, surely William Marbury would have brought his mandamus action there instead
of in the Supreme Court. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 724 (letter of Attorney General as part of
the answer of Postmaster-General Kendall).
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D.C. Circuit had the authority to mandamus executive officials.
Moreover precedent reveals that the Circuit Court never questioned its authority to issue a writ of mandamus when warranted.
Thus, for example, when an insurance company asked the D.C.
Circuit Court in 1801 to mandamus the Bank of Alexandria to
order it to issue stock, the Circuit Court refused because, the
majority concluded, the insurance company had an available legal remedy: namely, sue the bank for damages, use the moneys
awarded to purchase the stock claimed, and sue for additional
damages if the bank continued to refuse to "open its books." 37
But, significantly, the Court did not question its authority to issue a writ if there were no remedy at law. In fact, Chief Judge
Kilty dissented and would have issued the writ, because he questioned whether there really was an adeguate remedy at law. 38
Further, in United States v. Washington, 39 when the treasurer of
Washington County sought a writ of mandamus in 1819 ordering
the mayor of Washington to pay one-half the cost of rebuilding a
bridge over Rock Creek, pursuant to an act of Congress,40 the
Court issued the writ because there was no adequate remedy at
law. 41
Moreover, Chief Judge Cranch's opinion in the Kendall case
in 1837 implicitly suggests that, had William Marbury applied 26
years earlier, the Circuit Court would have been inclined to
grant the writ. In his opinion for the Circuit Court in Kendall,
Cranch emphasized the importance of having some court that
could remedy all legal wrongs, including wrongs by federal officers. In particular, he was adamant as to the Circuit Court's
power to issue a writ of mandamus in this type of case to remedy
an otherwise irreparable injury:
If a case is made out, in which, according to that law, the pro-

ceeding by mandamus is the proper remedy, this court is
bound to grant it .... If this court has not jurisdiction of the
case, no court has; and an individual who may have been ruined by the refusal of an officer to perform a ministerial act,
positively enjoined upon him by law, will be entirely without

37. United States v. Bank of Alexandria, 24 F. Cas. 982 (1801).
38. ld. at 984.
39. United States v. Washington, 28 F. Cas. 414 (1819).
40. Act of 1st of July, 1812, § 12, 2 Stat. 773
41. Washington, 28 F. Cas. at 414. See also Kennedy v. Washington, 14 F. Cas. 330
(1829) (declining to issue a writ because the defendants had discretion; thus, there was no
ministerial duty for the court to command).
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redress. 42

To be sure, Cranch wrote this in 1837 with the benefit of
Chief Justice John Marshall's views in Marbury. In fact, Cranch
quoted liberally from that opinion, emphasizing the importance
of having some court with power to remedy a wrong and noting
the difference between political actions of an executive official,
with which the judiciary should not interfere, and ministerial actions, which the courts may review. 43 The Circuit Court might
have been more timid in the early 1800's, possibly concluding it
did not have the power to mandamus the Secretary of State.
Admittedly, for the Circuit Court to decide after Marbury that it
can mandamus a Postmaster General does not clearly tell us
what it would have done with an 1801 request to mandamus the
Secretary of State. Cranch and his colleagues might have considered ordering a Secretary of State to do his duty as different
from ordering a Postmaster General to do his. Indeed, Cranch
notes in the Kendall case:
The suggestion that the president and heads of departments
are not responsible, except by impeachment, for the exercise
of their ministerial functions, seems to imply that the postmaster-general, like the heads of departments, may shelter
himself under the authority or command of the president.
But if they can do it, in a case like the present, where the duty
is expressly enjoined by an act of congress, this officer cannot
do it; for his relation to the president is very different from
theirs. They, in the very terms by which their offices were
created and their duties defined, are to perform such duties
and execute such orders as they shall be required to perform
and execute by the president of the United States .... The
postmaster-general, however, clearly bears no such relation to
the president. ... The postmaster-general, in the exercise of
the duties of his office, appears to be legally as independent of
the president as the president is of him. There can, therefore,
be no pretence for avoiding responsibility under any order of
the president, nor for showing the irresponsibility which may
be supposed to belong to that high officer. 44
Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 707,714.
Id. at 707-10, quoting Marshall in Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163-73.
.
Id. at 713-14. Justice Thompson, writing for the Supreme Court in Kendall, was
m accord:
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive
department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But
it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive off1cer any duty they may thmk proper, which is not repugnant to any rights
secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and re42.
43.
44.
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Summarizing, then, if we cannot be certain how the 1801
Circuit Court would have responded to a petition by Marbury
and his co-petitioners; we can nevertheless make several observations with confidence:
a. When Marbury and his co-petitioners tried to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court during the December
1801 term, they could have filed their petition instead in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. That court was created,
fully staffed, and functioning well before December 1801. 45
b. We know from Marbury v. Madison that, in a federal
court with appropriate jurisdiction, a writ of mandamus ordering
the Secretary of State to perform a ministerial duty was appropriate.46
c. We also know from Marbury that delivery of these commissions was a ministerial act and that William Marbury and his
colleagues were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to deliver their commissions. 47
d. Finally, we know from the Kendall cases, both in the Circuit Court and in the Supreme Court, that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction to hear a case like Marbury's and to issue a writ of
mandamus against a federal officer. 48 And we know from United
States v. Washington, 49 as well as Kendall, that the Circuit Court
was willing and able to issue writs of mandamus when the facts
warranted such a remedy. We cannot conclude, with the same
degree of confidence, that it would have actually issued the writ
requested by Marbury, but there is no evidence suggesting otherwise. On the contrary, as discussed above, the Circuit Court
showed no reluctance to issue such writs in the absence of an
adequate remedy at law.
4. What if Marbury and his co-petitioners had filed their suit ini-

tially in the Circuit Court and it had issued the writ and ordered
Secretary of State Madison to deliver the commissions?

Several scenarios are possible:

sponsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the
direction of the President. And this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character. 37 U.S. at 610.
45. Susan Low Bloch and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary
of the District of Columbia Circuit, 90 Geo. L.J. 549, 550-52 (2002).
46. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 171-73.
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173.
48. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 618.
49. Washington, 28 F. Cas. at 414. See note 41.
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Secretary of State Madison might have complied with the
judicial mandate and delivered the commissions; Marbury and
his co-petitioners would have become justices of the peace for
the remainder of their five-year term. But this alternative is not
only unlikely, it also would have fallen short of what Marbury
achieved. We would have learned that the judiciary can mandamus the executive branch, but we would have learned nothing
about judicial review of legislative action.
Alternatively, Secretary of State Madison might have appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the United States Supreme
Court. 50 Judging from what the Court said in Marbury, and later
in Kendall, it seems likely that it would have affirmed the Circuit
Court's decision. This would have confirmed the power of the
judiciary to review the legality of acts of the executive branch
and to mandamus the Secretary of State. But the case would
have provided no obvious opportunity for the Supreme Court to
establish the power to review the constitutionality of acts of
Congress, because no constitutionally questionable legislation
would have been involved. It also would have presented the risk
of presidential defiance.
The risk of defiance by Jefferson and Madison, as well as
congressional impeachment, was real. Jefferson never hid his
disdain for Marshall's decision in Marbury or for Marshall generally.51 Impeachment was also in the air. 52 Congress, by a
50. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction to review such actions by the Circuit Court. Sec Act of February 27, 1801, 2 Stat. 103, Ch. 15, §8 ("Be it further enacted,
that any final judgment, order or decree in said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States .... ").
51. In a letter to Albert Gallatin in 1810, Jefferson wrote about Marshall: "The
judge's inveteracy is profound, and his mind of that gloomy malignity which will never let
him forego the opportunity of satiating it on a victim." T. Jefferson to A. Gallatin, Sept.
27, 1810 in H. Adams, cd., 1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin 492 (Philadelphia, 1879).
See also Jefferson's complaint about Marshall years after Marbury. In Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), Marshall used a similar tactic of establishing strong powers
for the Court to review state court judgments, but then affirming the state court judgment so that, again, no one could defy anything. In a letter to Judge Johnson complaining
about this tactic, Jefferson wrote:
This practice of Judge Marshall, of traveling out of his case to prescribe what
the law would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular and very
censurable. I recollect another instance, and the more particularly, perhaps, because It m some measure bore on myself. Among the midnight appointments of
peace for Alexandria. These were signed and sealed by him, but not delivered. I
found them on the table of the department of State, on my entrance into the office, and I forbade their delivery. Marbury, named in one of them, applied to
the Supreme Court for a Mandamus to the Secretary of State (Mr. Madison), to
deliver the commission intended for him. The Court determined at once that
being an original process, they had no cognizance of it; and there the qudstion
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strictly partisan vote, had just repealed the Judiciar¥: Act of 1801
and eliminated the Supreme Court's 1802 Sessions. 3 The possibility of presidential defiance and impeachment was averted by
the actual Marbury decision because the Court found it had no
jurisdiction and therefore did not order the executive branch to
do anything. Marshall might have found a similarly clever way
to avoid a confrontation with the President even if Marbury had
initially sued in the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court had issued the writ.
Thus, if Marshall were concerned with the possibility that
Jefferson and Madison might defy the courts and thereby
weaken the judiciary, he might have endeavored to avoid affirming the lower court opinion. And, if he wanted the opportunity
to establish the power to review the constitutionality of federal
legislation, we know from his Marbury decision that he was
clever enough to find a constitutional conflict. Given Marshall's
ability to discover the constitutional problem with section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the actual Marbury case, 54 he might
before them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law
would be, had they jurisdiction of the case; to wit, that they should command
the delivery. The object was clearly to instruct any other court having the jurisdiction, what they should do, if Marbury should apply to them. Besides the impropriety of the of the gratuitous interference, could any thing exceed the perversion of law? For if there is any principle of law never yet contradicted, it is
that delivery is one of the essentials to the validity of the deed. Although signed
and sealed, yet as long as it remains in the hands of the party himself, it is in fieri
only, it is not a deed, and can be made so only by its delivery. In the hands of
the third person it may be made an escrow. But whatever is in the executive offices is certainly deemed to be in the hands of the President; and in this case,
was actually in my hands, because, when I countermanded them, there was as
yet no Secretary of State. Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually
cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on
its being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief Justice.
Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed., Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the
Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Gray and Bowen, 2d ed 1830).
52. The House of Representatives had impeached District Judge John Pickering at
the beginning of the 1803 session and was talking about impeaching Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. There were also threats to impeach Marshall if he were to decide in
favor of Marbury. Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at 185 (cited in
note 3).
53. See notes 6, 28.
54. The cleverness-some say "audacity" -of Marshall's approach to Marbury's
petition has been widely noted and discussed. Sec, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Justiciability
and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393 (1996)
(viewing the mandamus power of section 13 as best read to apply only to cases over
which the Court already has acquired jurisdiction); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom,
1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329, 366 (same); Akil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443 (1989); William Winslow Crosskey and Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 75
(Macmillan, 1988) (Marbury is "one of the most flagrant specimens of judicial activism
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have been able to find some minor constitutional infirmity with
the Act creating the Circuit Court of D.C.
It is possible, therefore, that, even if Marbury and his colleagues had sued initially in the Circuit Court, we would have
reached the same outcome. But getting there would have been,
at the least, more difficult and maybe impossible. It would have
required the "right" moves by more people, including a decision
by Jefferson and Madison to appeal an adverse ruling by the
Circuit Court, not just to ignore it. Judging from the fact that
defendant Madison never even appeared in the Supreme Court
when Marbury sued him there, 55 and from indications that Jefferson and Madison were, in fact, prepared to ignore an order
from the Supreme Court,56 the likelihood of their either complying with a Circuit Court order or appealing from the Circuit
Court to the Supreme Court seems remote.
In truth, the only realistic way to arrive at the results
achieved in Marbury v. Madison was for Marbury and his colleagues to sue originally in the Supreme Court, not the Circuit
Court, to seek relief from Justice John Marshall, not Judge
James Marshall. Because they did so, the Supreme Court was
able to establish the power of judicial review of both executive
and legislative actions without ordering anyone to do anything
and without providing any opportunity for turmoil, resistance, or
defiance. Moreover, the Supreme Court could do so economically, without having to rely on procedural "assistance" by any
Jeffersonians. So tidy and elegantly wrapped was this package
as to inspire one final question.
5. Was the result reached in Marbury v. Madison contemplated,
foreseen, or orchestrated by any of the participants in this drama?

and ... one of the worst opinions ever delivered by the Supreme Court"); Susan Low
Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373,
389 & n.60 (1982) (Marshall's interpretation of section 13 is "intellectually dishonest");
William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1.
Beveridge applauded the decision: "(B]y a coup as bold in design and as daring in execution as that by which the constitution had been framed, John Marshall set up a landmark
in American history." Beveridge, 3 The Life of John Marshall at 142 (cited in note 7)
55. Madison never appeared in the Supreme Court, but Attorney General Levi
Lincoln, who had been Acting Secretary of State before Madison arrived in town, did
answer the Court's inquiries concerning what he knew of the non-delivery of the commissions. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 143-145. Haskins and Johnson, History of the
Supreme Coun at 191-92 (cited in note 3).
56. Id. at 185.
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In theory, there are two interrelated ways in which the participants might have foreseen and arguably manipulated events
to enable John Marshall to achieve the results reached in Marbury v. Madison. First, John, and possibly his brother, might
have deliberately failed to deliver some of the commissions before John left the office of Secretary of State. Second, whether
or not the failure to deliver was deliberate, John Marshall might
have recognized the opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule
on the big issues and encouraged Marbury and his colleagues to
sue in the United States Supreme Court instead of the Circuit
Court of the District. Is there any evidence to support either
possibility? Several facts are, while not dispositive, at least intriguing.
As noted earlier, responsibility for delivering the freshlysigned commissions fell to the then-Secretary of State-and
newly-installed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-John Marshall who, apparently, ran out of tirne. 57 But brother James,
newly-appointed judge on the newly-created Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia, also played a role in the delivery-and
nondelivery. Specifically, on March 4, 1801, the day of Thomas
Jefferson's inauguration, Judge James Marshall was informed
that there was "reason to apprehend riotous proceedings" in Alexandria and wanted to ensure that there would be justices of
the peace available to deal with any troublemakers. 58 He went to
the Secretary of State's office and signed a receipt for several
commissions, intending to deliver them. 59 However, "finding that
he could not conveniently carry the whole," he returned several
commissions undelivered and crossed out those names from his
receipt. 60 Among the undelivered commissions James Marshall
returned were those of Robert Townsend Hooe and William
Harper, 61 who would soon unite with their colleagues, William
57. See Letter from John Marshall to James Marshall (cited in note 18 and quoted
in note 18), noting that he should have delivered the commissions "bur for the extreme
hurry of the time & the absence of Mr. Wapner [clerk in the Office of Secretary of
State.]. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 79-80 (cited in note 3).
58. This information comes from the affidavit filed by James Marshall which Marbury's attorney, Charles Lee, read to the Court. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 145-46.
59. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he went to the office of
the Secretary of State to pick up the commissions of the justices of the peace. He believed he picked up twelve of the nineteen Alexandria commissions. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 145-46 (1803). See also, Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at
79 (cited in note 3).
60. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146; Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 79
(cited in note 3). Lee used James Marshall's affidavit to confirm that the commissions
had in fact been signed and sealed.
61. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146 (affidavit of James Marshall); Garraty, ed.,
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Marbury and Dennis Ramsay, to seek help from the Supreme
Court. 62
Moreover, it is interesting to note that John Marshall had
somewhat more time to deliver these commissions than is commonly believed. The usual assumption is that time was prohibitively short because the justices of the peace were confirmed on
March 3, Adams' last day in office. But President Jefferson
asked Marshall to remain as Secretary of State for one more
day. 63 Marshall, therefore, had a little extra time to deliver the
remaining commissions.
John Marshall was clearly aware of the fact that some commissions had not been delivered. He says, in hindsight, that he
thought the lack of delivery was not that big a deal. In a letter to
his brother James, written March 18, 1801, two weeks after these
events, John Marshall wrote:
I did not send out the commissions because I apprehended
such as were for a fixd (sic) time to be completed when signd
(sic) & seald (sic) & such as depended on the will of the President might at any time be revokd (sic). To with hold the
commission of the Marshal [of the District] is equal to displacing him which the President I presume has the power to do;
but to with hold the commission of the Justices is an act of
which I entertaind (sic) no suspicion. I shoud (sic) however
have sent out the commissions which had been signd (sic) &
seald (sic) but for the extreme hurry of the time & the absence of Mr. Wagner [clerk in the office of Secretary of State]
who had been called on by the President to act as his private
secretary. 64

As this letter indicates, John Marshall both knew that some
commissions had not been delivered and, more significantly, had
already formulated the theory he was to use as Chief Justice for
concluding that delivery was not necessary to complete the appointment of the Justices of the Peace. This view was an essential step in the argument justifying the conclusion that delivery
was a ministerial, not discretionary, act that could be ordered by
a writ of mandamus. Thus, it is at least possible that in the waning hours of the Adams' Administration, John Marshall, with or
without his brother James, knowingly withheld the delivery of

Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 10-13 (cited in note 5).
62. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
63. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 44 (cited in note 3).
64. Letter from John Marshall to James M. Marshall at 90 (cited in note 18).
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some commissions to set the stage for this profoundly important
case in our country's legal foundation.
It is also possible (and more likely) that Marbury and his
colleagues knowingly chose to sue in the Supreme Court, and
not the Circuit Court, precisely because the Supreme Court
could use the case in the manner it did. Sometime before December 1801, Chief Justice Marshall might have foreseen that he
could use the case in the manner he eventually did and might
have let it be known that suing in the Supreme Court was the
preferred course. As noted, he had already articulated an important aspect of the Marbury logic.
Moreover, the case for "orchestration" is strengthened by
the fact that, notwithstanding Marshall's clear declaration in
Marbury of Marbury and his colleagues' right to the commissions and to a writ of mandamus from an appropriate court,
none of the petitioners appears to have pursued his quest. Why
not? Close to three years remained of their five-year term.
Armed with the Chief Justice's opinion, they could have easily
marched into the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and
sought the writ. 65 If Marbury and his co-petitioners were so anxious for the office, sufficiently so to take their case to the highest
court of the land, why, when it seemed so available, did none of
them pursue it? The justice of the peace position was, it is true, a
relatively low level job, but it was an important stepping stone to
higher office and, however modest, appeared to be perceived by
the litigants as desirable. 66 lt is not unduly cynical to question the
true mission of their Supreme Court suit: Did they really want
these commissions or were they simply being good Federalists
giving John Marshall the perfect vehicle by which to establish
65. From the time of the Marbury decision on February 24, 1803 until November
16, 1803, the composition of the circuit court remained the same: Kilty, Cranch, and
James Marshall. After James Marshall resigned in November, he was replaced by Nicholas Fitzhugh, who took his seat on November 25, 1803.
66. For a description of duties of justice of the peace, see note 2. According to
Dewey, in the areas of the District outside the towns of Alexandria and Georgetown, the
justices of the peace were the principal governing body. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jeffer·
son at 81 (cited in note 3). Dewey also says, quoting Charles Sydnor, that in Virginia politics "admission to the office of justice of the peace [or magistrate] ... [was] the first upward step in a political career .... " Apparently, this step had been taken by George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Wythe, and George Mason.
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 82 (cited on note 3). President James Monroe evidently thought it worthwhile to serve as a magistrate even after he left the White House.
Id.; Daniel C. Gilman, Giants of America: The Founding Fathers Series 231-32 (Arlington
House, 1970); See also Forte, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 354 (cited in note 5). On the other
hand, as James Simon has noted, none of the four petitioners in Marbury needed the
money from the job. Simon, What Kind of Nation at 175 (cited in note 4).
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the powers of the Court? It certainly fit well into Marshall's desire to strengthen the court. 67
CONCLUSION
Precisely why William Marbury, William Harper, Robert
Townsend Hooe, and Dennis Ramsay brought their suit in the
United States Supreme Court will probably remain a mystery.
All we can say with certainty is that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia was up and running in 1801, that Marbury and
his lawyer were clearly aware of that fact, that the Circuit Court
had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in a case of this
type, and that it was willing to exercise this power in the appropriate situation. Whether the Circuit Court would have done so
if Marbury had sued there, and whether anyone knew the Supreme Court would find that it did not have original jurisdiction
to do so, will probably never be known. But these questions pale
in light of the profound impact of the resulting decision. 68
Whether by clever orchestration or mere serendipity, William
Marbury's decision to sue in the Supreme Court, instead of the
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, profoundly impacted
our constitutional history. With this relatively simple case, Chief
Justice John Marshall was able to establish the power of the federal judiciary to review both executive and legislative actions,
while "modestly" declining jurisdiction, ordering no one to do
anything, and thus providing no opportunity for defiance or resistance. It was a remarkable feat for which we are all in his
debt.

67. Marshall began the practice of writing opinions for the Court, instead of the
prior practice of seriatim opinions. Here, too, Jefferson disapproved. In the 1823 letter
to Judge Johnson, cited in note 51, Jefferson wrote:
I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. I have heard it often no·
ticed, and always with high approbation. Some of your brethren will be encouraged to follow it occasionally, and in time, it may be felt by all as a duty, and the
sound practice of the primitive court be again restored. Why should not every
judge be asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay?
Besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, which the public have a right to
know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable or not, it would show whether
the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly the weight of
their authority.
68. And perhaps Bacon, not Shakespeare, wrote the plays. But, in the end, what
counts, in terms of our everlasting betterment, is that someone did.

